



SMA Reach-back Report

Post-War Economic Development & Reconstruction in Iraq & Syria

Question (R6.5): *After a long period of war, both Iraq and Syria are devastated and considerable rebuilding efforts will be necessary to make these countries economically sound again. Is there an opportunity to entice regional countries to invest and thus improve stability and inter-state relations in the region and decrease their (economical) dependence on western countries? What impact does foreign military sales have on the ultimate regional stability?*

Contributors: Jennifer Cafarella, Institute for the Study of War; Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy, London University (UK); Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Ms. Mona Yacoubian, United States Institute of Peace

Executive Summary

Sarah Canina, NSI Inc.

In studying what would motivate regional actors to support post-conflict reconstruction and development in Iraq and Syria, experts noted one concern that predominated the decision calculus of potential donors: the risk that ISIS or a similar group may resurge more quickly than efforts by regional and great power actors to foster economic stability and growth. In the absence of good governance and economic opportunities, the concern is that ISIS may regain a foothold among Sunni communities that least benefit from development aid administered by Shia-lead governments. But regional countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Iran are expected to make significant investments and donations for post-conflict reconstruction. These countries—along with Russia and China—are also driven to invest for economic gains in terms of reconstruction contracts as well as to expand their spheres of influence in the region. This response highlights potential donors, motivations and disincentives for their contributions, as well as the role that Coalition foreign military sales may have on post-conflict stability.

Potential Donors & Their Motivations

We asked the experts which regional countries would likely be willing to donate reconstruction aid in Iraq and Syria. The table below lists potential donors as well as their incentives and disincentives for doing so. For reference, we list amounts pledged at the most recent donor conference in support of Iraqi reconstruction on 14 February 2018 that may provide insight into how willing each country might be to donate reconstruction aid in the future.¹

¹ Coker, M. (2018). Hoping for \$100 Billion to Rebuild, Iraq Got Less Than a Third. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/world/middleeast/iraq-kuwait-donor->

Country	February 2018 Donor Conference Pledge	Incentives & Disincentives for Donating Reconstruction Aid in Iraq and/or Syria
Turkey	\$5 billion in investment loans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentives: Generate influence amongst Iraqi Turkmen; develop leverage over Iraqi Kurds and Iranian proxies in disputed areas; set conditions for return of refugees (Cafarella & Kagan) • Disincentives: scale of aid needed is immense; Insurgency will move faster than reconstruction; risk of widening Iraqi civil war jeopardizing investments (Cafarella & Kagan); furthermore, Turkish investment in Syria would not be acceptable to the Assad government (O'Shaughnessy)
Kuwait	\$1 billion in investment and \$1 billion in loans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentives: Prevent renewed insurgency (Cafarella & Kagan) • Disincentives: scale of aid needed is immense; Insurgency will move faster than reconstruction (Cafarella & Kagan)
Saudi Arabia	unspecified investment and loan deals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentives: Counter Iranian influence & prevent renewed insurgency (Cafarella & Kagan) • Disincentives: scale of aid needed is immense; Insurgency will move faster than reconstruction & financial requirements in other theaters (Yemen, Lebanon) (Cafarella & Kagan)
Iran	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentives: Foremost, to expand Iranian influence across the region and establish a Shia land bridge to Lebanon (R6.9); has the resources and competence (O'Shaughnessy) • Disincentives: Sunni populations may find extensive Shia influence unacceptable in Iraq (O'Shaughnessy)
Regional Sunni Nations (Egypt, North Africa, Jordan)	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentives: Sunni contractors would likely be received favorably by Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria (O'Shaughnessy) • Disincentives: Would need to be funded by donor nations (O'Shaughnessy)

As mentioned in the introduction, Ms. Jennifer Cafarella and Dr. Kimberly Kagan of the Institute for the Study of War argue that while Sunni Arab countries—particularly Saudi Arabia—are traditionally reluctant to invest in countries with Shia-dominated governments, in this case they are driven by a desire to prevent renewed insurgency. Turkey—which has historic ties to Iraq in terms of its physical proximity, affinity with Iraqi Turkmen, economic opportunities, and, more recently, its desire to return displaced populations to Iraq—might be expected to contribute significantly to post-conflict

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reconstruction in northern Iraq, according to Dr. Nicholas O'Shaughnessy of the University of London (UK). Iran has the resources and competence to invest heavily in post-conflict Iraq and Syria to bring the region securely into its sphere of influence, according to O'Shaughnessy. However, he notes that Sunni populations may find extensive Shia influence unacceptable, at least in Iraq. For many, it is too soon to tell what kind of post-conflict aid might be available in Syria as the outcome of its civil war remains unsettled.

While the topic of this response focuses on regional actors, Dr. Spencer Meredith of National Defense University writes that the US risks losing political influence in the region if it yields responsibility for reconstruction to regional countries. He notes that the absence of US presence in the region would open the door wider for other actors to influence the political, social, and economic trajectory of the Middle East. Furthermore, he points out that the focus on regional actors implied in the question ignores the important roles that Russia and China are likely to play in reconstruction. Russia, along with Iran, is seeking reconstruction contracts as payback for wartime expenses in Syria and Iraq (Cafarella & Kagan, Meredith). China, which is already the lender of first resort in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is making inroads in Latin America, could very well use its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative to increase its influence in the Middle East (Meredith).

Finally, Dr. Abdulaziz Sager from the Gulf Research Center, argues that it is not possible to entice regional countries to invest heavily in rebuilding Iraq and Syria. "There is simply no willingness by regional countries to invest in Iraq while it is still controlled to a large degree by Iran or while Syria is gripped by large degrees of uncertainty." Dr. Sager argues that stability in Iraq and Syria will come only as a result of government reform. "And this is primarily the responsibility of the West who brought about many of the problems currently being witnessed. It would be false to assume that regional countries can be party to the guilt to force them to now take the lead in re-building these countries," Dr. Sager notes.

Impact of Foreign Military Sales on Regional Security

The last aspect of this question asks what impact foreign military sales (presumably instead of reconstruction or humanitarian aid) would have on long-term regional stability. Contributors to this question were divided on whether the benefits of providing only military aid outweighed the risks of providing primarily social and economic reconstruction aid to Iraq and Syria. The table below outlines the risks and benefits of a military aid and sales only approach.

Table 1 Risks and benefits of providing only foreign military sales to post-conflict Iraq and Syria

Risks			Benefits		
Resurgence of extremism (Yacoubian)			Equip US partners to fight adversaries (Cafarella & Kagan, Yacoubian)		
Promote kinetic solutions to local problems (Yacoubian)			History suggests that arms races in the Middle East can be managed (Meredith)		
Undercut humanitarian needs (Cafarella & Kagan, Yacoubian)			Allows US to focus efforts on manageable goals (Meredith)		
Military aid can be repurposed for			Allows agnosticism of US		

other conflicts (Cafarella & Kagan)	government (Meredith)
Missed opportunity as alternative (to Daesh) supplier of essential services (Cafarella & Kagan)	Changes narrative to US as a great power (Meredith)
Propagates narrative that US is only interested in war (O'Shaughnessy)	Efficient and effective (O'Shaughnessy)
Associates US as a provider of weapons (O'Shaughnessy)	

Risks

Experts cited two risks to relying primarily on military aid to support stability in post-conflict Iraq and Syria: a resurgence of Sunni extremism, and missing an opportunity to expand positive US influence in the region. Ms. Mona Yacoubian of the United States Institute of Peace along with Ms. Cafarella and Dr. Kagan argue that as long as Sunni communities lack economic opportunities, extremism will thrive. Furthermore, in terms of influence, the US would miss an opportunity to be seen as a credible, alternative source of support for Sunni civilians vulnerable to extremist recruitment (Cafarella & Kagan). Reconstruction funds could be used as a powerful source of leverage to pursue US national security and regional stability goals. These types of funds could also be used to push back expanding Iranian and Russian influence and stymie significant financial remunerations from reconstruction contracts. That is why Cafarella and Kagan argue that the USG must condition US aid to “ensure that developmental support empowers legitimate parties that adhere to international laws and norms.” Finally, experts also point out that once military aid in the form of weapons and equipment is given, it may be repurposed for conflicts against US interests.

Benefits

If the US preference is to leave the region relatively stable as it reduces the US military footprint there, an approach based solely on military aid and sales may be the most practical solution, according to Dr. Meredith. He notes that this approach is simple, focused, and achievable. Furthermore, he believes that it frees the US from the “occupier” and “liberalizing destabilizer” narratives and allows it to act as a “Democratic Great Power.” Along these lines, this approach allows the US to turn the table on Russia and allows it to act as a spoiler to Russia’s development and stabilization efforts.

Expert Contributions

Ms. Jennifer Cafarella and Dr. Kimberly Kagan

Institute for the Study of War

Which regional actors have the economic capacity and infrastructure to aid in reconstruction as contractors or as donors in ways that will encourage stability rather than hinder it? Please respond for both contractors and donors.

- Donors: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait

What incentives and disincentives do these actors have to doing so?

Donor: Saudi Arabia

- Incentives?
 - Provides Saudi Arabia with local influence to balance and/or counter Iranian influence on local and national levels in Iraq
 - Helps set conditions to prevent renewed insurgency by aiding Iraq's physical and economic recovery
- Disincentives?
 - The scale of the requirements to rebuild Iraq is immense. It will likely take decades. A renewed insurgency will move faster than reconstruction.
 - Financial requirements in other priority theaters such as Yemen and Lebanon

Donor: Turkey

- Incentives?
 - Generate local influence in Iraqi Turkmen communities
 - Develop local leverage over Iraqi Kurds and Iranian proxies in disputed areas
 - Helps set conditions for Iraqi refugees to return
- Disincentives?
 - The scale of the requirements to rebuild Iraq is immense. It will likely take decades. A renewed insurgency will move faster than reconstruction.
 - Financial & aid requirements in Syria
 - The risk of a widening Iraqi civil war could dis-incentivize Turkey to invest in reconstruction in northern Iraq in the near term

Donor: Kuwait

- Incentives?
 - Helps set conditions to prevent renewed insurgency by aiding Iraq's physical and economic recovery
- Disincentives?

- The scale of the requirements to rebuild Iraq is immense. It will likely take decades. A renewed insurgency will move faster than reconstruction.

What would be the impact on regional stability if the USG primarily provided military aid (i.e., arms sales) instead of developmental aid? Please respond to each bullet below.

- What are the risks for regional stability of the USG providing primarily military rather than humanitarian and reconstruction aid?
 - Sunni insurgencies will continue to regrow, recruit, and generate attacks as long as Iraq's cities remain destroyed and Iraqi Sunnis have few economic opportunities
 - Military aid could be repurposed for use in other conflicts such as the widening Iraqi Government confrontation against Iraqi Kurdistan
 - Misses the opportunity to provide a credible alternative source of basic humanitarian and political needs for Sunni civilians that have turned or could soon turn to groups like ISIS and al Qaeda
- What are the benefits for regional stability of this approach?
 - Would equip U.S. partners to counter renewed insurgency militarily
 - Reduces US costs
 - Removes risk that ISIS and/or al Qaeda can acquire or benefit from US developmental aid
- Do the risks outweigh the benefits?
 - No. A combination of both military and developmental aid is required in order to set conditions to achieve and maintain stability

Would you like to make any other comments?

Reconstruction funds and contracts are a powerful source of leverage that the US should use purposefully to set conditions that favor desirable outcomes for US national security and regional stability. The US must deny Russia and Iran from capturing reconstruction funds and contracts. Russia and Iran seek to exploit reconstruction in both Iraq and Syria to generate revenue as a repayment for their wartime expenses. Assad intends to provide these concessions to Russia and Iran in Syria, and Iraq's Prime Minister Haider al Abadi lacks the power or political influence to prevent the cooptation of reconstruction in Iraq. The U.S. and American regional partners must condition reconstruction funds and other developmental support in ways that preclude Russia and Iran from gaining access. The US and American partners should instead ensure that developmental support empowers legitimate parties that adhere to international law and norms.

Ambassador James Jeffrey

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Questions

Which regional actors have the economic capacity and infrastructure to aid in reconstruction as contractors or as donors in ways that will encourage stability rather than hinder it? Please respond for both contractors and donors.

- Contractors:

- Donors:

What incentives and disincentives do these actors have to doing so?

Contractor:

- Incentives?

- Disincentives?

Donor:

- Incentives?

- Disincentives?

What would be the impact on regional stability if the USG primarily provided military aid (i.e., arms sales) instead of developmental aid? Please respond to each bullet below.

- What are the risks for regional stability of the USG providing primarily military rather than humanitarian and reconstruction aid?
- What are the benefits for regional stability of this approach?
- Do the risks outweigh the benefits?

Would you like to make any other comments?

I did not answer the above because aside from the level of detail required I question the thrust of the exercise. As I outlined in my response to R6.6 I do not think that reconstruction can play a key role in promoting stability in these two countries per se. Humanitarian assistance can have an impact short term on human lives, and there are thus compelling altruistic and some policy reasons for providing it. Economic development over the long term has shown in some discrete areas—as noted in above question in the oil sector, certainly in Iraq—some success, but this is too diffuse and long-term to be a reliable contributor to ‘stability,’ especially if we define stability as societies able to push back against VEO’s and/or Iran as part of a relatively short term U.S. ‘exit strategy’.

The key exception is the use of reconstruction (including through assistance by Gulf States) as a 'quid' for political/security outcomes that meet U.S. and regional security requirements. This is currently U.S. policy re Syria reconstruction (i.e., not to be undertaken unless the political-Geneva process 'shows progress') and it should be used, delicately, with Iraq. The U.S. and EU rebuilt much of Lebanon after the 2006 war instigated by Iranian surrogate Hezbollah, and that state is now effectively an ally and power projection platform not of the West, but of Iran.

Dr. Spencer Meredith III

College of International Security Affairs

National Defense University

Questions

Which regional actors have the economic capacity and infrastructure to aid in reconstruction as contractors or as donors in ways that will encourage stability rather than hinder it? Please respond for both contractors and donors.

- Contractors:
- Donors:

What incentives and disincentives do these actors have to doing so?

Contractor:

- Incentives?
- Disincentives?

Donor:

- Incentives?
- Disincentives?

What would be the impact on regional stability if the USG primarily provided military aid (i.e., arms sales) instead of developmental aid? Please respond to each bullet below.

- What are the risks for regional stability of the USG providing primarily military rather than humanitarian and reconstruction aid? China – already seeing PRC replace US as lender of first resort in sub-Saharan Africa, moving that way in Latin America. OBOR opens that door even more so. Risk is losing geopolitical influence.
- What are the benefits for regional stability of this approach? Arms races are nothing new to the region so they can be managed. Doing so now will allow for a focused effort on manageable, feasible goals. Moves towards greater agnosticism about how states govern given most if not all in region use the language of “democracy” (despite variations on the degrees of effectiveness and responsiveness). Frees the US to act as Democratic Great Power rather than feed Russian/Iranian and evolving Turkish narratives that US is “liberalizing” destabilizer.
- Do the risks outweigh the benefits? Yes, but only as part of counter-Chinese activities in CAR to raise costs for PRC there – US is not the dominant player so should play the spoiler role (as Russia is currently doing in ME).

Questions

Which regional actors have the economic capacity and infrastructure to aid in reconstruction as contractors or as donors in ways that will encourage stability rather than hinder it? Please respond for both contractors and donors.

- Contractors:
- Turkey is a regional actor with significant resources and competencies but the limitation that it will appear to be compromised and would certainly not be acceptable to the Syrian government. Iran which also has resources and competence is also a self-limiting quantity because it is unacceptable to Sunnis and seeks selfish ends in Iraq. One possible contractor however could be Egypt. Contractors may also be sourced from other North African countries and potentially from Lebanon. Israel is probably de-barred from reconstruction work although it has plenty of expertise. This leaves Europe, as well as being a major donor it could also be a major contractor. Jordan is a highly sympathetic country but probably too small in scale to be a significant infrastructure contractor.
- Donors:
- The region with real self interest in this matter is Europe which remains stunned by the migration crisis, its scale and the nationalist zealotry it has triggered within Europe. The EU also has resources and the furthest point of the EU, that is Cyprus, is very near the middle east, very near Lebanon. For these and other factors the EU should be persuaded to be a major partner and owner in the recovery of these states, for reasons both altruistic and self-serving. The role is an obvious one and could be the critical role because the middle east represents a clear and persistent threat to Europe in all kinds of ways, from migration to terrorism.

What incentives and disincentives do these actors have to doing so?

Contractor:

- Incentives? The likelihood of contractors being well remunerated for their work: the possibility of providing a large amount of employment via a visiting workforce as well as for the existing populations of those countries; the prestige of being involved in the reconstruction of utterly devastated lands to a degree that has not been seen since the Second World War.
- Disincentives? The situation is still likely to be volatile with a residual military and terrorist threat, and secondly the problem of being under corrupt regional or local or even national administrations which make implementing the work difficult.

Donor:

- Incentives? Public perception of the donor nations as a good global citizen: acceptance by their internal publics as this is a good use of overseas aid – as distinct from some of the other ways in which overseas aid is generally used. Secondly, internal security especially within Europe – the more these nations are stabilized and their infrastructure rebuilt, the more their citizens have an idea of the future and the less likely they are to seek legal or illegal migration, and the less likely are their youth to degenerate into supporters of terrorism. So this could be positive publicity for the EU.
- Disincentives? Real enemy here is compassion fatigue – that is to say the domestic audience becomes tired and merely wants to forget the problem. Also of course if a residual terror problem emerges and those attempting reconstruction are attacked, ambushed et cetera.

What would be the impact on regional stability if the USG primarily provided military aid (i.e., arms sales) instead of developmental aid? Please respond to each bullet below.

- What are the risks for regional stability of the USG providing primarily military rather than humanitarian and reconstruction aid? The US military aid is very important and it is badly needed, it is also expensive: and so one way forward would be a division of labour - between the US, supplying military aid, and EU and aid organisations providing aid for civil reconstruction. The problem here is one of perception, the USA being seen as only interested in the sinews of war rather than rebuilding lives and infrastructures. The issue then is one of association – the association of the US with weaponry rather than building up the integuments of civic culture and economic well-being.
- What are the benefits for regional stability of this approach?
- That it is efficient and effective, enabling a realistic division of labour: and moreover giving regional governments the power to repel predators, whether hostile nation states or internal insurgent groups and especially fanatical Islamists.
- Do the risks outweigh the benefits?

Probably they do in that the US is playing to its strengths in the training and provision of advanced weaponry. The US has no obvious expertise in forms of civilian reconstruction but other agencies do, for example the United Nations.

After a long period of war, both Iraq and Syria are devastated and considerable rebuilding efforts will be necessary to make these countries economically sound again. Is there an opportunity to entice regional countries to invest and thus improve stability and inter-state relations in the region and decrease their (economical) dependence on western countries? What impact does foreign military sales have on the ultimate regional stability?

For the moment, it is not possible to entice regional countries to invest heavily in the rebuilding of Iraq and Syria. There is simply no willingness by regional countries to invest in Iraq while it is still controlled to a large degree by Iran or while Syria is gripped by large degrees of uncertainty. Overall, it can be said that psychological, political and practical reasons exist that prevent such investment. For example, regional states themselves face economic uncertainty given the prolonged period of low oil prices and the lower level of financial resources available to consider outside investment options. There is also the fact that past experiences, for example, in Lebanon or in Syria, have been negative with previous investments having completely evaporated. What will bring back the stability is the reform of the regime(s). And this is primarily the responsibility of the West who brought about many of the problems currently being witnessed. It would be false to assume that regional countries can be party to the guilt to force them to now take the lead in re-building these countries.

Ms. Mona Yacoubian

USIP

Questions

Which regional actors have the economic capacity and infrastructure to aid in reconstruction as contractors or as donors in ways that will encourage stability rather than hinder it? Please respond for both contractors and donors.

- Contractors:
- Donors: Several multilateral donors could play a leading role. Certainly, UNDP in Iraq and the Syria Recovery Trust Fund in Syria. More broadly, the Gulf is vastly underplaying its potential role in the stabilization/reconstruction space. In particular, Saudi, UAE, and Qatar could do more, ideally funneling resources through approved/respected multilateral channels. The World Bank could expand its role in Iraq. It is unlikely to play an appreciable role in Syria anytime soon. The U.S., Germany and Japan can also continue to play key roles in Iraq. Syria is far more problematic with Assad still in power, given Western donor statements that they will not contribute to reconstruction efforts in Syria in the absence of a political transition that takes Assad out of power.

What incentives and disincentives do these actors have to doing so?

Contractor:

- Incentives?
- Disincentives?

Donor:

- Incentives? Bring greater stability to Iraq and Syria. Minimize refugee flows and move to return IDPs.
- Disincentives? In Syria, entrench the Assad regime. Free rider problem for the Gulf.

What would be the impact on regional stability if the USG primarily provided military aid (i.e., arms sales) instead of developmental aid? Please respond to each bullet below.

- What are the risks for regional stability of the USG providing primarily military rather than humanitarian and reconstruction aid? This approach could dramatically undercut stability by implicitly promoting kinetic and security responses to the region's multifaceted challenges. It would also undercut the ability to fulfill the vast humanitarian and stabilization needs which are essential to sustaining military victories.
- What are the benefits for regional stability of this approach? Very few tangible benefits to this approach. It would allow regional allies to maintain kinetic abilities, but at this point, non-kinetic responses are far more important for anchoring and consolidating military wins.

- Do the risks outweigh the benefits? The risks of this approach far outweigh the benefits. We have already witnessed how not paying appropriate attention to the humanitarian, stabilization and governance challenges, post-military victory can easily give rise to a return of extremism. Focusing on military assistance at the expense of humanitarian and development aid will necessarily lead to a skewed approach to the region that does not effectively address the region's long-term challenges and ironically may set the conditions that will require future military interventions by the US.

Would you like to make any other comments? The broad outlines of Iraq's longer term reconstruction and development needs as well as the pathways for how to address those needs are fairly clear. While the needs are no doubt great, there are some clear pathways, working through the Iraqi government and focusing on decentralization, to begin to reach these goals. Syria is far more complicated. Even as the endgame of the civil war approaches, the international community is largely opposed to providing reconstruction assistance while Assad remains in power. The reasoning behind this opposition is sound – such assistance will further entrench the regime and its brutal and corrupt practices. In so doing, this type of reconstruction aid will serve to set the conditions for future conflict. That said, ignoring Syria altogether also poses great challenges, leaving a festering wound in the region, potential power vacuums and a deepening humanitarian/displacement crisis. Instead the international community—with the U.S. in a leadership role—needs to develop more creative and innovative approaches to Syria. These approaches would feature a decentralized, bottom-up approach that prioritizes areas not under direct regime control. It would also focus on looking to rebuild the social fabric in these areas, not just address immediate stabilization needs. This could be accomplished through local level dialogues and reconciliation efforts, both within and across communities. Finally, discrete grassroots dialogues between regime and non-regime held areas could also begin to put in place the foundations of a future Syria, by beginning to rebuild bridges across these fractured areas and promote independent, reform-minded efforts in both areas, no doubt a long term (20 year +) proposition, but a necessary one.

Biographies

Ms. Jennifer Cafarella



Jennifer Cafarella is the Senior Intelligence Planner at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). She is responsible for shaping and overseeing the development of ISW's plans and recommendations for achieving U.S. objectives against enemies and adversaries and in conflict zones. Previously, as a Syria analyst at ISW, she researched and wrote on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and various opposition groups in Syria, with a particular focus on al Qaeda. She served as the lead author of the report "America's Way Ahead in

Syria," which was published in March 2017 as part of the series "U.S. Grand Strategy: Destroying ISIS and al Qaeda." Ms. Cafarella served as a co-author on ISW's previous planning exercise reports, including: "Al Qaeda and ISIS: Existential Threats to the U.S. and Europe," "Competing Visions for Iraq and Syria: The Myth of an Anti-ISIS Grand Coalition," and "Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS: Sources of Strength."

Ms. Cafarella's essays have been published by The Hill and Fox News, among other outlets. She has appeared extensively in the media. Her analysis has been cited by The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Newsweek, CNN, NPR, Voice of America, the BBC, and USA Today. She is a graduate of ISW's Hertog War Studies Program and was ISW's first Evans Hanson Fellow. The Evans Hanson Fellowship draws from the outstanding alumni of the ISW Hertog War Studies and helps develop the next generation of national security leaders. Ms. Cafarella received her B.A. from the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities in Global Studies with a focus on the Middle East. She is proficient in Arabic.

Ambassador James Jeffrey

Ambassador James F. Jeffrey is the Philip Solondz distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute where he focuses on U.S. diplomatic and military strategy in the Middle East, with emphasis on Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

One of the nation's most senior diplomats, Ambassador Jeffrey has held a series of highly sensitive posts in Washington D.C. and abroad. In addition to his service as ambassador in Ankara and Baghdad, he served as assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration, with a special focus on Iran. He previously served as principal deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State, where his responsibilities included leading the Iran policy team and coordinating public diplomacy. Earlier appointments included service as senior advisor on Iraq to the secretary of state; chargé d'affaires and deputy chief of mission in Baghdad; deputy chief of mission in Ankara; and ambassador to Albania.



A former infantry officer in the U.S. army, Ambassador Jeffrey served in Germany and Vietnam from 1969 to 1976.

Dr. Kimberly Kagan



Dr. Kimberly Kagan is the founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War. She is a military historian who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University. She is the author of *The Eye of Command* (2006) and *The Surge: a Military History* (2009). She is the editor of *The Imperial Moment* (2010). Dr. Kagan has published numerous essays in outlets such as the *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, *The Weekly Standard*, and *Foreign Policy*. She co-produced *The Surge: The Whole Story*, an hour-long oral history and documentary film on the campaign in Iraq from 2007 to 2008.

Dr. Kagan served in Kabul for seventeen months from 2010 to 2012 working for commanders of the International Security Assistance Force, General David H. Petraeus and subsequently General John Allen. Admiral Mike Mullen, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized Dr. Kagan for this deployment as a volunteer with the Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor the Chairman can present to civilians who do not work for the Department of Defense.

Dr. Kagan previously served as a member of General Stanley McChrystal's strategic assessment team, comprised of civilian experts, during his campaign review in June and July 2009. Dr. Kagan also served on the Academic Advisory Board at the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at CENTCOM. She conducted many regular battlefield circulations of Iraq between May 2007 and April 2010 while General Petraeus and General Raymond T. Odierno served as the MNF-I Commanding General. She participated formally on the Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team for Multi-National Force-Iraq - U.S. Mission - Iraq in October 2008 and October 2009, and as part of the Civilian Advisory Team for the CENTCOM strategic review in January 2009.

Dr. Kagan held an Olin Postdoctoral Fellowship in Military History at Yale International Security Studies in 2004 to 2005 and was a National Security Fellow at Harvard's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies in 2002 to 2003. She received a B.A. in Classical Civilization and a Ph.D. in History from Yale University.

Dr. Spencer Meredith

Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III is a professor of national security strategy at the US National Defense University. With a doctorate in Government and Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, and two decades of research and work on post-Soviet regions and the Middle East, his expertise bridges scholarly and practitioner communities. To that end, he has published widely on strategic topics related to democratic development, conflict resolution, and special operations. He is a Fulbright Scholar and a regular advisor and contributor to several DoD and interagency projects, including multiple Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessments, intelligence community workshops, and JSOC efforts supporting the joint warfighter in the areas of governance, human factors of conflict, and influence operations.



Dr. Nicholas O'Shaughnessy



Dr. Nicholas O'Shaughnessy is Professor of Communication at Queen Mary, University of London, UK and latterly director of their Marketing and Communications Group; Visiting Professor (2016-) in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, and a Quondam Fellow of Hughes Hall Cambridge University. Earlier in his career he taught for eleven years at Cambridge. Nicholas is the author or co-author or editor of numerous books on commercial and political persuasion.

Ultimately his concern is with the 'engineering of consent'- the troubling matter of how public opinion can be manufactured, and governments elected, via sophisticated methodologies of persuasion developed in the consumer economy.

A co-authored book, *Theory and Concepts in Political Marketing*, was published in April 2013 with Sage. *Selling Hitler: Propaganda and the Nazi Brand* (Hurst) was published in September 2016, and a second volume – *Marketing The Third Reich: Persuasion, Packaging and Propaganda*- has been out since September 2017 with Routledge. 'Key Readings In Propaganda' (with Paul Baines, four volumes, Sage London 2012): Volume One: Historical origins, definition, changing nature. Volume Two: The psychology and sociology underpinning Propaganda. Volume Three: Propaganda in military and terrorism contexts. Volume Four: Advances and contemporary issues in Propaganda.

Other topics in propaganda are pursued in numerous journal articles such as *Selling Terror: The Symbolization and Positioning of Jihad* (with Paul Baines), *Marketing Theory* Volume 9 (2) (pp 207-221) 2009. *The Dark Side of Political Marketing, Islamist Propaganda, Reversal Theory and British Muslims* with Paul Baines et al, *European Journal of Marketing*. V44 3/4 2010. *Al Qaeda message evolution and positioning, 1998- 2008: Propaganda analysis re-visited*, Baines and O'Shaughnessy, *Public Relations Inquiry* pp 163-191 May 2014. *Putin, Xi, And Hitler: propaganda and the paternity of pseudo democracy*. *Defence Strategic Communications* (the official journal of NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence) Vol 2 Spring 2017. *The Politics of Consumption And the Consumption of Politics: How Authoritarian Regimes Shape Public Opinion By Using Consumer Marketing Tools*. *Journal of Advertising Research*, June 2017, 57 (2).

His perspective has always been that persuasion is the hidden hand of history, its core dynamic. And certainly it is the case that propaganda has become again an important part of our global public and civic discourse.

Dr. Abdulaziz Sager



A Saudi expert on Gulf politics and strategic issues, **Dr. Abdulaziz Sager** is the founder and Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, a global think tank based in Jeddah with a well-established worldwide network of partners and offices in both the Gulf region and Europe.

In this capacity, Dr. Sager has authored and edited numerous publications including *Combating Violence & Terrorism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, *The GCC's Political & Economic Strategy towards Post-War Iraq and Reforms in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Feasible Solutions*. He is also a frequent

contributor to major international media channels and appears regularly on Al-Arabiya Television, France 24 and the BBC. In addition to his academic activities, Dr. Sager is actively engaged in track-two and mediation meeting. For example, he has chaired and moderated the Syrian opposition meetings in Riyadh in December 2015 and November 2017.

In addition to his work with the Gulf Research Center, Dr. Sager is President of Sager Group Holding in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is active in the fields of information technology, aviation services and investments. Furthermore, he holds numerous other appointments including on the Makkah Province Council, Advisory Board of the Arab Thought Foundation, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Faculty of Economics and Administration at King Abdulaziz University, Saudi Ministry of Education, Geneva Center for Security Policy and German Orient Foundation. Dr. Sager has also sat on the advisory group for the UNDP Arab Human Development Report, and participates in the Think Tank Leaders Forum of the World Economic Forum and the Council of Councils of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Dr. Sager holds a Ph.D in Politics and International Relations from Lancaster University and an M.A. from the University of Kent, United Kingdom and a Bachelor Degree from the Faculty of Economics and Administration of King Abdulaziz University.

Ms. Mona Yacoubian



Mona Yacoubian joined the U.S. Institute of Piece after serving as deputy assistant administrator in the Middle East Bureau at USAID from 2014-2017, where she has responsibility for Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Yacoubian was a senior advisor at the Stimson Center, where her work focused on the Arab uprisings, with an emphasis on Syria. Prior to joining, the Stimson Center, where her work focused on Lebanon and Syria, as well as broader issues related to democratization in the Arab world.

Ms. Yacoubian's research focuses on conflict analysis and prevention in the Middle East, with a specific focus on Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Her interests also include fragility and resilience.

Ms. Yacoubian was a Fulbright scholar in Syria, where she studied Arabic at the University of Damascus from 1985 to 1986. She has held an international affairs fellowship with the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) and is currently a CFR member. Ms. Yacoubian earned an MPA from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and a BA from Duke University.

Ms. Sarah Canna

Sarah Canna applies her open source analytic skills to regions of vital concern to US Combatant Commands, particularly the Middle East and South Asia. To help military planners understand the complex socio-cultural dynamics at play in evolving conflict situations, she developed a Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa™) tool, which is designed to rapidly respond to emergent crises by pulsing NSI's extensive subject matter expert (SME) network to provide deep, customized, multidisciplinary analysis for defense and industry clients. Prior to joining NSI, she completed her Master's degree from Georgetown University in Technology and Security Studies. She holds a translation certificate in Spanish from American University and has been learning Dari for three years.

